Abstrakti
We propose a simple price-control mechanism correcting for a missing short-
run response of demand to prices. It effectively implements an aggregate demand
response by a time-varying price cap that optimally adjusts to information on the
social value of rationing. A quantification obtains this information from supply
and demand bids to the Nordic power market, showing how the mechanism could
be incorporated to the market-clearing routines. The mechanism does not bind
in normal times but gains traction in a persistent supply shock and stops binding
again when the market has adjusted to the new normal.
run response of demand to prices. It effectively implements an aggregate demand
response by a time-varying price cap that optimally adjusts to information on the
social value of rationing. A quantification obtains this information from supply
and demand bids to the Nordic power market, showing how the mechanism could
be incorporated to the market-clearing routines. The mechanism does not bind
in normal times but gains traction in a persistent supply shock and stops binding
again when the market has adjusted to the new normal.
| Alkuperäiskieli | Englanti |
|---|---|
| Kustantaja | MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) |
| Tila | Julkaistu - 2022 |
| OKM-julkaisutyyppi | D4 Julkaistu kehittämis- tai tutkimusraportti taikka -selvitys |