Public Employees as Politicians: Evidence from Close Elections

Tutkimustuotos: Lehtiartikkelivertaisarvioitu

Tutkijat

Organisaatiot

  • University of Jyväskylä
  • Stockholm University
  • The London School of Economics and Political Science
  • VATT Institute for Economic Research
  • KU Leuven

Kuvaus

We analyze the effect of municipal employees' political representation in municipal councils on local public spending. We use within-party, as-good-as-random variation in close elections in the Finnish open-list proportional election system to quantify the effect. One more councilor employed by the public sector increases spending by about 1%. The effect comes largely through the largest party and is specific to the employment sector of the municipal employee. The results are consistent with public employees having an information advantage over other politicians, and thus, being able to influence policy.

Yksityiskohdat

AlkuperäiskieliEnglanti
Sivut68-81
Sivumäärä14
JulkaisuAmerican Political Science Review
Vuosikerta112
Numero1
TilaJulkaistu - 1 helmikuuta 2018
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA1 Julkaistu artikkeli, soviteltu

ID: 18878553