Local aggregative games

Vikas K. Garg, Tommi Jaakkola

Tutkimustuotos: LehtiartikkeliConference articleScientificvertaisarvioitu

4 Sitaatiot (Scopus)

Abstrakti

Aggregative games provide a rich abstraction to model strategic multi-agent interactions. We introduce local aggregative games, where the payoff of each player is a function of its own action and the aggregate behavior of its neighbors in a connected digraph. We show the existence of a pure strategy e-Nash equilibrium in such games when the payoff functions are convex or sub-modular. We prove an information theoretic lower bound, in a value oracle model, on approximating the structure of the digraph with non-negative monotone sub-modular cost functions on the edge set cardinality. We also define a new notion of structural stability, and introduce 7-aggregative games that generalize local aggregative games and admit e-Nash equilibrium that is stable with respect to small changes in some specified graph property. Moreover, we provide algorithms for our models that can meaningfully estimate the game structure and the parameters of the aggregator function from real voting data.

AlkuperäiskieliEnglanti
Sivut5342-5352
Sivumäärä11
JulkaisuADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS
TilaJulkaistu - 2017
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA4 Artikkeli konferenssijulkaisuussa
TapahtumaANNUAL CONFERENCE ON NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS - Long Beach, Yhdysvallat
Kesto: 4 joulukuuta 20179 joulukuuta 2017
Konferenssinumero: 31

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