Information in Mechanism Design

Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki

Tutkimustuotos: Artikkeli kirjassa/konferenssijulkaisussaConference contributionScientificvertaisarvioitu

12 Sitaatiot (Scopus)

Abstrakti

The mechanism design literature of the last thirty years has been a big success on a number of different levels. A beautiful theoretical literature has shown how a wide range of institutional design questions can be formally posed as mechanism design problems with a common structure. We can understand institutions as solutions to well-defined maximization problems subject to incentive constraints. Elegant characterizations of optimal mechanisms have been obtained. Market design has become more important in many economic arenas both because of newinsights from theory and developments in information technology. A very successful econometric literature has tested auction theory in practice. The basic issue in mechanism design is how to truthfully elicit private and decentralized information in order to achieve some private or social objective. The task of the principal is then to design a game of incomplete information in which the agents have indeed an incentive to reveal the information. The optimal design depends on the common prior, which the principal and the agents share about the types of the agents. Unfortunately, the general theory, the applications and the empirical work have rather different natural starting points. The theoretical analysis begins with a given common prior, often over a small set of types, and then analyzes the optimal mechanism with respect to this prior. Yet, the fine details of the specified environment incorporated in the common prior are rarely available to the designer in practice.
AlkuperäiskieliEnglanti
OtsikkoProceedings of the 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society. Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications. Volume I
ToimittajatR. Blundell, W.K. Newey, T. Persson
JulkaisupaikkaCambridge
KustantajaCambridge University Press
Sivut186-221
Sivumäärä36
ISBN (elektroninen)9781139052269
ISBN (painettu)9780521871525
DOI - pysyväislinkit
TilaJulkaistu - 2006
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA4 Artikkeli konferenssijulkaisuussa
TapahtumaWorld Congress of the Econometric-Society - University College London, London, Iso-Britannia
Kesto: 19 elokuuta 200524 elokuuta 2005
Konferenssinumero: 9

Julkaisusarja

NimiEconometric Society Monographs
KustantajaCambridge University Press
Vuosikerta41

Conference

ConferenceWorld Congress of the Econometric-Society
MaaIso-Britannia
KaupunkiLondon
Ajanjakso19/08/200524/08/2005

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  • Siteeraa tätä

    Bergemann, D., & Välimäki, J. (2006). Information in Mechanism Design. teoksessa R. Blundell, W. K. Newey, & T. Persson (Toimittajat), Proceedings of the 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society. Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications. Volume I (Sivut 186-221). (Econometric Society Monographs; Vuosikerta 41). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139052269.007