Ex-post Analysis of the TeliaSonera-Chess 2005 Merger

Norbert Maier; Julie Runge Jørgensen; Asger Lunde; Otto Toivanen

doi:10.1007/s10645-020-09381-y

Ex-post Analysis of the TeliaSonera-Chess 2005 Merger

Norbert Maier
, Julie Runge Jørgensen
, Asger Lunde^*
, Otto Toivanen

^*Tämän työn vastaava kirjoittaja

Tutkimustuotos: Lehtiartikkeli › Article › Scientific › vertaisarvioitu

1 Sitaatiot (Scopus)

Abstrakti

We provide an ex-post analysis of the 2005 TeliaSonera-Chess merger in the Norwegian mobile telecommunication market. Applying a difference-in-difference approach and a synthetic control group method we find little evidence of price increase in the Norwegian mobile telecom market after the merger. Possible explanations for these findings include that Chess was a small player in the market without its own physical network, with a market share of 8% at the time of the merger and no spectrum license, and that by taking Chess on board moving it from Telenor’s network, TeliaSonera could better exploit potential economies of scale related to the operation of its physical network and spectrum.

Alkuperäiskieli	Englanti
Sivut	141-178
Sivumäärä	38
Julkaisu	De Economist
Vuosikerta	169
Varhainen verkossa julkaisun päivämäärä	1 tammik. 2021
DOI - pysyväislinkit	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-020-09381-y
Tila	Julkaistu - toukok. 2021
OKM-julkaisutyyppi	A1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä

Rahoitus

The authors would like to thank Henrik Ballebye Okholm, Bruno Basalisco and Claus Kastberg Nielsen for helpful comments, Elisa Pau and Mattias Almqvist for excellent research assistance, and the Norwegian Competition Authority for funding. All the remaining errors are those of the authors.

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10.1007/s10645-020-09381-y

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title = "Ex-post Analysis of the TeliaSonera-Chess 2005 Merger",

abstract = "We provide an ex-post analysis of the 2005 TeliaSonera-Chess merger in the Norwegian mobile telecommunication market. Applying a difference-in-difference approach and a synthetic control group method we find little evidence of price increase in the Norwegian mobile telecom market after the merger. Possible explanations for these findings include that Chess was a small player in the market without its own physical network, with a market share of 8\% at the time of the merger and no spectrum license, and that by taking Chess on board moving it from Telenor{\textquoteright}s network, TeliaSonera could better exploit potential economies of scale related to the operation of its physical network and spectrum.",

keywords = "Ex-post studies, Merger control, MNO, MVNO, Telecommunications",

author = "Norbert Maier and J{\o}rgensen, \{Julie Runge\} and Asger Lunde and Otto Toivanen",

year = "2021",

month = may,

doi = "10.1007/s10645-020-09381-y",

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volume = "169",

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journal = "De Economist",

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T1 - Ex-post Analysis of the TeliaSonera-Chess 2005 Merger

AU - Maier, Norbert

AU - Jørgensen, Julie Runge

AU - Lunde, Asger

AU - Toivanen, Otto

PY - 2021/5

Y1 - 2021/5

N2 - We provide an ex-post analysis of the 2005 TeliaSonera-Chess merger in the Norwegian mobile telecommunication market. Applying a difference-in-difference approach and a synthetic control group method we find little evidence of price increase in the Norwegian mobile telecom market after the merger. Possible explanations for these findings include that Chess was a small player in the market without its own physical network, with a market share of 8% at the time of the merger and no spectrum license, and that by taking Chess on board moving it from Telenor’s network, TeliaSonera could better exploit potential economies of scale related to the operation of its physical network and spectrum.

AB - We provide an ex-post analysis of the 2005 TeliaSonera-Chess merger in the Norwegian mobile telecommunication market. Applying a difference-in-difference approach and a synthetic control group method we find little evidence of price increase in the Norwegian mobile telecom market after the merger. Possible explanations for these findings include that Chess was a small player in the market without its own physical network, with a market share of 8% at the time of the merger and no spectrum license, and that by taking Chess on board moving it from Telenor’s network, TeliaSonera could better exploit potential economies of scale related to the operation of its physical network and spectrum.

KW - Ex-post studies

KW - Merger control

KW - MNO

KW - MVNO

KW - Telecommunications

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85098511760

U2 - 10.1007/s10645-020-09381-y

DO - 10.1007/s10645-020-09381-y

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85098511760

SN - 0013-063X

VL - 169

SP - 141

EP - 178

JO - De Economist

JF - De Economist

ER -

Ex-post Analysis of the TeliaSonera-Chess 2005 Merger

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