Essays on Resource Exploitation under Fixed Costs

Eero Sillasto

Essays on Resource Exploitation under Fixed Costs

Julkaisun otsikon käännös: Esseitä resurssien käytöstä

Eero Sillasto

Taloustieteen laitos

Tutkimustuotos: Doctoral Thesis › Collection of Articles

Abstrakti

Tämä väitöskirja koostuu kolmesta esseestä, jotka kuuluvat resurssitaloustieteen tutkimusalaan. Tutkin niissä kuinka kiinteät kustannukset vaikuttavat tuotantoon, kun tuotannon kokonaismäärä on äärellinen ja kun kiinteiden kustannusten jatkuva maksaminen on edellytys tulevalle tuotannolle. Kiinteiden kustannusten takia tuotannolla on minimiskaala, ja siksi tuotannon päättyessä hinta ja tuotannon taso muuttuvat diskreetisti. Ensimmäisessä esseessä keskityn tehokkaaseen ratkaisuun ja kuvaan sen ominaisuuksia. Sosiaalisen suunnittelijan ongelma on hyvin määritelty toisin kuin aiemmassa kirjallisuudessa, jossa kiinteät kustannukset riippuvat tuotannosta. Osoitan myös, että kilpailullista allokaatiota ei ole olemassa, koska hinnan ottavat kilpailijat käyttäytyisivät strategisesti. Resurssin varantojen tehohas hyödyntämisjärjestys riippuu sekä resurssien varantojakaumasta että niiden käytön kustannusrakenteesta. Toisessa esseessä tutkin äärellisiä varantoja, jotka ovat yksityisessä omistuksessa. Oletan, että resurssien omistajat toimivat strategisesti ja pelaavat open-loop strategioita. Osoitan, että on olemassa tasapainoja, joissa resurssin eri varantoja käytetään yhtäaikaa, ja toisaalta tasapainoja, joissa varannot käytetään peräkkäin. Osoitan myös, että omistajat eivät tasapainossa lopeta tuotantoaan samanaikaisesti ja ettei symmetrisiä ratkaisuja ole olemassa. Kolmannessa esseessä tutkin tuotannon aloitusta. Rajoitun tuotantoprojekteihin, joissa tuotannon pituus on etukäteen tiedossa, ja joiden vaikutukset muihin projekteihin on tunnetut. Kuvaan tuotannon aloituksen pelinä, jossa pelaajat vaikuttavat muiden pelaajien tuotannon aloitukseen omalla tuotannon aloituksellaan. Osoitan, että pelissä tuotannon aloitusjärjestys, aloituksen ajankohdat ja tuotannon taso voivat poiketa tehokkaasta. Kolmen projektin tapauksessa pisin projekti aloittaa tasapainossa tuotannon ensin, ja kaksi lyhyempää pisimmän projektin jälkeen kummassa tahansa järjestyksessä.

Julkaisun otsikon käännös	Esseitä resurssien käytöstä
Alkuperäiskieli	Englanti
Pätevyys	Tohtorintutkinto
Myöntävä instituutio	Aalto-yliopisto
Valvoja/neuvonantaja	Liski, Matti, Vastuuprofessori Terviö, Marko, Ohjaaja Murto, Pauli, Ohjaaja
Kustantaja	Aalto University
Painoksen ISBN	978-952-60-8633-0
Sähköinen ISBN	978-952-60-8634-7
Tila	Julkaistu - 2019
OKM-julkaisutyyppi	G5 Tohtorinväitöskirja (artikkeli)

Tutkimusalat

resurssin käyttö
äärellinen tuotanto
kiinteät kustannukset
peli
open-loop strategia
tuotannon aloitus

Pääsy asiakirjaan

http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-60-8634-7

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@phdthesis{629e18bd06af421ba93735fa84b8fd59,

title = "Essays on Resource Exploitation under Fixed Costs",

abstract = "This dissertation consists of three essays on resource economics. In these essays I analyze the implementation of fixed costs for activities with a finite amount of production. I assume that the fixed costs are a characteristic of an activity and the continuous costs must be incurred for not losing the activity permanently. I show that, if the economic activity is finite in its duration, fixed costs induce minimal scales and also discrete effects on market outcomes. I show further how such discrete effects influence, for instance, the exploitation paces, the exploitation order and the price path. The first essay concentrates on the efficient solution of exploiting exhaustible deposits of a commodity under fixed costs. In contrast to the previous literature, the efficient solution is well defined. I derive the characteristics of an efficient solution, and show that it cannot be decentralized as a competitive allocation, because the price-taking agents would act strategically. The efficient order of exploiting the deposits, which is a classical resource economics question, depends both on the deposits' stock allocations and on their cost structures. The second essay describes strategic interactions for private deposit owners under fixed costs.I show that there are equilibria in open-loop strategies, in which deposits are exploited concurrently, and others, in which they are exploited sequentially. I show further that agents do not exit simultaneously and that there are no symmetric equilibria. The third essay introduces the entry. I limit my attention to economic activity where the projects have each a fixed production time, and also a given and discrete impact on other projects executed concurrently with them. I describe an entry game where the entrants influence other entrants' entry decisions by pre-empting. I show that the entry order and the level of industry concentrationare distorted when compared to the efficient solution.",

keywords = "resource exploitation, finite production, fixed costs, game, open-loop strategy, entry, resurssin k{\"a}ytt{\"o}, {\"a}{\"a}rellinen tuotanto, kiinte{\"a}t kustannukset, peli, open-loop strategia, tuotannon aloitus, resource exploitation, finite production, fixed costs, game, open-loop strategy, entry",

author = "Eero Sillasto",

year = "2019",

language = "English",

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series = "Aalto University publication series DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS",

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N2 - This dissertation consists of three essays on resource economics. In these essays I analyze the implementation of fixed costs for activities with a finite amount of production. I assume that the fixed costs are a characteristic of an activity and the continuous costs must be incurred for not losing the activity permanently. I show that, if the economic activity is finite in its duration, fixed costs induce minimal scales and also discrete effects on market outcomes. I show further how such discrete effects influence, for instance, the exploitation paces, the exploitation order and the price path. The first essay concentrates on the efficient solution of exploiting exhaustible deposits of a commodity under fixed costs. In contrast to the previous literature, the efficient solution is well defined. I derive the characteristics of an efficient solution, and show that it cannot be decentralized as a competitive allocation, because the price-taking agents would act strategically. The efficient order of exploiting the deposits, which is a classical resource economics question, depends both on the deposits' stock allocations and on their cost structures. The second essay describes strategic interactions for private deposit owners under fixed costs.I show that there are equilibria in open-loop strategies, in which deposits are exploited concurrently, and others, in which they are exploited sequentially. I show further that agents do not exit simultaneously and that there are no symmetric equilibria. The third essay introduces the entry. I limit my attention to economic activity where the projects have each a fixed production time, and also a given and discrete impact on other projects executed concurrently with them. I describe an entry game where the entrants influence other entrants' entry decisions by pre-empting. I show that the entry order and the level of industry concentrationare distorted when compared to the efficient solution.

AB - This dissertation consists of three essays on resource economics. In these essays I analyze the implementation of fixed costs for activities with a finite amount of production. I assume that the fixed costs are a characteristic of an activity and the continuous costs must be incurred for not losing the activity permanently. I show that, if the economic activity is finite in its duration, fixed costs induce minimal scales and also discrete effects on market outcomes. I show further how such discrete effects influence, for instance, the exploitation paces, the exploitation order and the price path. The first essay concentrates on the efficient solution of exploiting exhaustible deposits of a commodity under fixed costs. In contrast to the previous literature, the efficient solution is well defined. I derive the characteristics of an efficient solution, and show that it cannot be decentralized as a competitive allocation, because the price-taking agents would act strategically. The efficient order of exploiting the deposits, which is a classical resource economics question, depends both on the deposits' stock allocations and on their cost structures. The second essay describes strategic interactions for private deposit owners under fixed costs.I show that there are equilibria in open-loop strategies, in which deposits are exploited concurrently, and others, in which they are exploited sequentially. I show further that agents do not exit simultaneously and that there are no symmetric equilibria. The third essay introduces the entry. I limit my attention to economic activity where the projects have each a fixed production time, and also a given and discrete impact on other projects executed concurrently with them. I describe an entry game where the entrants influence other entrants' entry decisions by pre-empting. I show that the entry order and the level of industry concentrationare distorted when compared to the efficient solution.

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KW - open-loop strategy

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