Determinants of voluntary executive stock option disclosure in Brazil

Eduardo Schiehll*, Paulo Renato Soares Terra, Fernanda Gomes Victor

*Tämän työn vastaava kirjoittaja

Tutkimustuotos: LehtiartikkeliArticleScientificvertaisarvioitu

18 Sitaatiot (Scopus)

Abstrakti

This study investigates whether the governance attributes of Brazilian companies are associated with voluntary executive stock option (ESO) disclosure. Results show that Brazilian companies voluntarily disclose very little about their ESO plans, and that board size, presence of a compensation committee, and auditing by a Big 4 firm are significantly related to the degree of voluntary ESO disclosure. We also show that family-controlled companies in Brazil are associated with low voluntary ESO disclosure. Results are robust to a number of specification tests, dependent and explanatory variable measurements, and sample composition. This study has professional and regulatory implications for Brazil and other emerging capital markets. The results underscore the need for stricter rules for executive compensation reporting in Brazil, and they invite policy makers and regulators in emerging markets to consider the effects of company-level governance factors on disclosure incentives.

AlkuperäiskieliEnglanti
Sivut331-361
Sivumäärä31
JulkaisuJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE
Vuosikerta17
Numero2
DOI - pysyväislinkit
TilaJulkaistu - 1 tammik. 2013
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA1 Julkaistu artikkeli, soviteltu

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