Abstrakti
Allowing a compromised device to e.g., receive privacy-sensitive sensor readings carries significant privacy risks, but to implement the relying party of a contemporary attestation protocol in a computationally constrained sensor is not feasible, and the network reach of a sensor is often limited. In this paper, we present a remote platform attestation protocol suitable for relying parties that are limited to symmetric-key cryptography and a single communication channel. We validate its security with the ProVerif model checker.
Alkuperäiskieli | Englanti |
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Otsikko | Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy |
Toimittajat | Gabriele Lenzini, Paolo Mori, Steven Furnell |
Kustantaja | SciTePress |
Sivut | 701-708 |
Sivumäärä | 8 |
ISBN (painettu) | 9789897586835 |
DOI - pysyväislinkit | |
Tila | Julkaistu - 2024 |
OKM-julkaisutyyppi | A4 Artikkeli konferenssijulkaisussa |
Tapahtuma | International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Rome, Italia Kesto: 26 helmik. 2024 → 28 helmik. 2024 Konferenssinumero: 10 |
Julkaisusarja
Nimi | International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy |
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Vuosikerta | 1 |
ISSN (elektroninen) | 2184-4356 |
Conference
Conference | International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy |
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Lyhennettä | ICISSP |
Maa/Alue | Italia |
Kaupunki | Rome |
Ajanjakso | 26/02/2024 → 28/02/2024 |