Asymmetric regulation, managerial discretion, and corporate political strategies

Tutkimustuotos: Artikkeli kirjassa/konferenssijulkaisussaAbstractScientificvertaisarvioitu

Abstrakti

We study why managers engage in corporate political strategizing. Our rigorous data driven historical study of top management strategizing, of a state-owned telecommunications provider for a period of 18 years, exposes previously unattended links between top management’s managerial discretion and engagement in political strategizing. We find two managerial discretion dilemmas triggering political strategizing during market convergence: (1) resource discretion due to asymmetric regulation; and (2) market discretion due to unbalanced competitive preconditions. We contribute with a novel understanding of the contextual and managerial antecedents of political strategizing, and a dynamic view on managerial discretion. Furthermore, we advance a rigorous digital history approach, one that is historically cognizant and temporally and contextually grounded, to study top management strategizing.

AlkuperäiskieliEnglanti
DOI - pysyväislinkit
TilaJulkaistu - 1 tammikuuta 2018
OKM-julkaisutyyppiEi oikeutettu
TapahtumaAcademy of Management Annual Meeting: Improving Lives - Chicago, Yhdysvallat
Kesto: 10 elokuuta 201814 elokuuta 2018
Konferenssinumero: 78

Conference

ConferenceAcademy of Management Annual Meeting
LyhennettäAOM
MaaYhdysvallat
KaupunkiChicago
Ajanjakso10/08/201814/08/2018

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