An efficient authentication protocol for smart grid communication based on on-chip-error-correcting physical unclonable function

Security has become a main concern for the smart grid to move from research and development to industry. Central to this security paradigm is the concept of resistance to threats, whether emanating from an active adversary seeking to disrupt operations or a passive entity covertly intercepting sensitive data. In this dynamic landscape, smart meters (SMs) stand as the sentinels at the edge of the grid, silently gathering and transmitting invaluable data. Yet, this very placement often leaves them vulnerable in unprotected areas, underscoring the paramount importance of physical security in the smart grid. It is here that Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have emerged as a formidable ally. These unique constructs serve as guardians of physical security, leveraging the inherent unpredictability of manufacturing processes to create cryptographic keys. PUFs, however, are not without their own conundrums, primarily in the realm of reliability. This challenge has prevented their widespread integration into cryptographic applications. Fuzzy extractors have been considered as a solution to solve the reliability problem of PUFs, albeit at the cost of imposing significant computational burdens. To that end, we first propose an on-chip-error-correcting (OCEC) PUF that efficiently generates stable digits for the authentication process. Afterward, we introduce a lightweight authentication protocol between the SMs and neighborhood gateway (NG) based on the proposed PUF. The provable security analysis shows that not only the proposed protocol can stand secure in the Canetti–Krawczyk (CK) adversary model but also provides additional security features. Also, the performance evaluation demonstrates the significant improvement of the proposed scheme in comparison with the state-of-the-art.