Waiting for my neighbors

Sidartha Gordon*, Emeric Henry, Pauli Murto

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We introduce a neighborhood structure in a waiting game, where the payoff of stopping increases when neighbors stop. We show that the dynamic evolution of the network can take the form of either a shrinking network, where players at the edges stop first, or a fragmenting network where interior players do. In addition to the coordination inefficiency standard in waiting games, the neighborhood structure gives rise to an additional inefficiency linked to the order in which players stop. We discuss an application to technology adoption in networks.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)251-282
Number of pages32
JournalRAND Journal of Economics
Volume52
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2021
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Keywords

  • LOCALIZATION
  • DIFFUSION
  • KNOWLEDGE
  • ADOPTION

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