Use of HFACS and fault tree model for collision risk factors analysis of icebreaker assistance in ice-covered waters

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Abstract

With the global warming and a large amount of sea ice melting, the available Arctic Sea Route has greatly enhanced the value of Arctic shipping. Ship operations under icebreaker assistance have become an essential way to facilitate the safe navigation of merchant vessels sailing through the Arctic Sea Route in ice-covered waters, but they can also put the crew and the ship in danger caused by a possible collision between the assisted ship and the icebreaker. In this paper, a dedicated Human and Organizational Factors (HoFs) model of ship collision accidents between an assisted ship and an icebreaker is developed and analyzed with the aim to identify and classify collision risk factors. First, a modified model of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) for collision accidents between a ship and an icebreaker in ice-covered waters is proposed, which helps to analyze ship collision reports. Then, a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) model is utilized to analyze the fundamental collision risk factors according to the statistical analysis of accident reports and expert judgments based on the HFACS-SIBCI model. Finally, qualitative analysis is carried out to analyze collision risk factors under icebreaker assistance, where Risk Control Options (RCOs) are formulated. An important guidance for the risk control of ship collisions during icebreaker assistance in ice-covered waters is provided for lawmakers and shipping companies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)128-143
Number of pages16
JournalSafety Science
Volume111
Early online date1 Jan 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2019
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Funding

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive suggestions which comprehensively improve the paper. This study was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) under Grant No. 51579203 and 51711530033 and the Excellent Dissertation Cultivation Funds of Wuhan University of Technology under Grant No. 2016-YS-041 . This work has also been supported by the H2020-MCSA-RISE project “RESET - Reliability and Safety Engineering and Technology for large maritime engineering systems” under Grant No. 730888 . We thank Professor Jianhua Wu from Wuhan University of Technology, Captain Jianzhong Wang from Polar Research Institute of China and Pilot Hao Wang and Ye Tao from Pilot Station of Tianjin. Appendix A • List of the accident analyzed: # Icebreaker The assisted ship Time Ice conditions Power of IB Type of accident 1 TOR VINGAVAG 3rd of April 1985 at 23:10 LT Severe Ice 8.9 MW Collision in ice-covered waters 2 NGORD SVOLGA 13th of March 1998 at13:40 LT. Mild Ice 16,240 KW Collision in ice-covered waters 3 YMER TEQUILA 22th of February 1985 at 04:05 LT. Severe Ice 16240KW Collision in ice-covered waters 4 YMER BREMON 24th of March 1994 at18:10 LT Rough Ice 16,240 KW Collision in ice-covered waters 5 ALE SHOUTTLE GOTEBORG 01th of March 1996 at18:20 LT Normal Ice 3540 KW Collision in ice-covered waters 6 ALE ASPEN 14th of February 2011 at13:20 LT Normal Ice 3540 KW Collision in ice-covered waters 7 ODEN GRACHTBORG 27th of January 1999 at 01:55 LT Rough Ice 18,250 KW Collision in ice-covered waters 8 – BREMON 27th of February 1994 at 04:38 LT Normal Ice 18,250 KW Collision in ice-covered waters 9 ODEN ASSIEUROLINK 11th of March 1994 at19:45 LT Rough-Very Rough Ice 18,250 KW Collision in ice-covered waters 10 FREJ SUZAPOLYARNY 1st of February 1987 at 06:10 LT Normal Ice 16,240 KW Collision in ice-covered waters 11 ATLE RISOLUTO 7th of March 1993 at 05:41 LT Fast Pack Ice 16,240 KW Collision in ice-covered waters 12 ATLE VIOLA GORTHON 10th of February 2003 at 12:25 LT Rough Refrozen Drift Ice 16,240 KW Collision in ice-covered waters 13 – ARCTIC 29th of March 1993 at 18:27 LT Flat Ice 16,240 KW Collision in ice-covered waters 14 – HALLAREN 22th of March 2001 at 05:20 LT Normal Ice 16,240 KW Collision in ice-covered waters 15 ATLE SALSA 20th of January 2011 at 00:57 LT Mild Ice 16,240 KW Collision in ice-covered waters 16 FREJ NOREN 1st of April 2006 at 00:57 LT Rough-Very Rough Ice 16,240 KW Collision in ice-covered waters 17 VAYGACH NORDIC BARENTS 15st of March 2017 at 16:11 LT Mild Ice 35.0 MW Collision in ice-covered waters • List of the frequency of contributing factors mentioned: # Maneuver failures of the assisted ship Maneuver failures of the icebreaker Lack of situational awareness Negligence Judgment failures Ice condition Ice ridge Bad visibility Snow or rain weather Steering gear failure Communication equipment failure Poor communication between ships Improper route selection Over safety speed Unmaintained safety distance Deviation from suggested route Lack of emergency operation Lack of icebreaking ability Lack of engine power Anti-collision rule gap 1 1 * 0 ** 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 5 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 7 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 8 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 9 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 10 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 11 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 12 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 14 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 15 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 16 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 17 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 Total 10 11 8 8 3 8 17 7 6 1 2 10 3 15 11 4 8 6 12 2 Note: * 1 denotes that the factors are mentioned in the accident. ** 0 denotes that the factors are not mentioned in the accident. Appendix B • Format of the questionnaire provided to identify and classify the ship collision risk factors. Ship collision risk factors Unsafe acts Preconditions for unsafe acts Unsafe supervision Organizational factors External factors Maneuver failures of the assisted ship √ Maneuver failures of the icebreaker √ … … … … … … What else do you think? Engine failure √ … … … … … … Appendix C • 29 minimum cut sets are shown as follow: Minimum cut sets of the FT for collision accidents under icebreaker assistance {[L3-2],[L3-4],[L5-1],[L5-2]}; {[L1-1],[L1-3],[L1-5],[L2-8]}; {[L1-1],[L1-3],[L1-5],[L2-6]}; {[L2-5],[L2-7],[L4-1]}; {[L1-2],[L1-4],[L2-5],[L3-1]}; {[L2-7],[L2-8],[L4-1]}; {[L1-2],[L1-4],[L2-8],[L3-1]}; {[L2-6],[L2-7],[L4-1]}; {[L1-2],[L1-4],[L2-6],[L3-1]}; {[L2-1],[L2-3],[L2-9],[L5-3]}; {[L2-1],[L2-3],[L2-10]}; {[L2-1],[L2-3],[L3-2]}; {[L2-2],[L2-3],[L2-9],[L5-3]}; {[L2-2],[L2-3],[L2-10]}; {[L2-2],[L2-3],[L3-2]}; {[L2-1],[L2-4],[L2-9],[L5-3]}; {[L2-1],[L2-4],[L2-10]}; {[L2-1],[L2-4],[L3-2]}; {[L2-2],[L2-4],[L2-9],[L5-3]}; {[L2-2],[L2-4],[L2-10]}; {[L2-2],[L2-4],[L3-2]}; {[L3-3],[L3-4],[L5-1],[L5-2]}; {[L2-1],[L2-3],[L3-3]}; {[L2-2],[L2-3],[L3-3]}; {[L2-1],[L2-4],[L3-3]}; {[L2-2],[L2-4],[L3-3]}; {[L2-9],[L3-4],[L5-1],[L5-2],[L5-3]}; {[L1-1],[L1-3],[L1-5],[L2-5]}; {[L3-4],[L5-1],[L5-2],[L2-10]}; Note: The cut set in a fault tree is a set of basic events whose (simultaneous) occurrence ensures that the TOP event occurs, and the minimum cut set denotes that a cut set is said to be minimal if the set cannot be reduced without losing its status as a cut set.

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 3 - Good Health and Well-being
    SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being

Keywords

  • Arctic shipping
  • Collision accidents
  • FTA
  • HFACS
  • Ship to icebreaker
  • DESIGN
  • TRANSPORTATION
  • OPERATIONS
  • SAFETY
  • ARCTIC WATERS
  • RAILWAY ACCIDENTS
  • SEA
  • VESSELS
  • ORGANIZATIONAL-FACTORS
  • WINTER NAVIGATION

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