US government TARP bailout and bank lottery behavior

Luca Del Viva, Eero Kasanen, Anthony Saunders, Lenos Trigeorgis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Considerable debate surrounds how the US government's TARP bailout intervention has affected the risk-taking and moral hazard behavior of U.S. banks around the global financial crisis. We examine this issue with a focus on lottery behavior introducing MAX/MIN as a new measure of lotteryness in banking to capture the loss protection from bank bailout guarantees. We find that the TARP bailout increased the likelihood of bank lotteryness and risk shifting. Lottery-like bank equities are riskier after TARP and exhibit fatter right to left tails. A consistent pattern of risk taking and lottery behavior extends both before and after the 2008–2009 crisis, engulfing the largest systemic banks (SIFIs). While confirming that lottery-like bank equities have lower short-term return, we find they exhibit better cumulative long-term return performance. Our findings have important policy implications regarding government intervention in banking crises.
Original languageEnglish
Article number101777
JournalJOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 2 Nov 2020
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Keywords

  • Lottery behavior
  • Regulatory bailout
  • Bank stocks
  • Risk taking
  • TARP
  • Equity returns

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'US government TARP bailout and bank lottery behavior'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this