Securing IPv6 neighbor and router discovery

Jari Arkko*, Tuomas Aura, James Kempf, Vesa Matti Mäntylä, Pekka Nikander, Michael Roe

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference article in proceedingsScientificpeer-review

45 Citations (Scopus)


When IPv6 Neighbor and Router Discovery functions were defined, it was assumed that the local link would consist of mutually trusting nodes. However, the recent developments in public wireless networks, such as WLANs, have radically changed the situation. The nodes on a local link cannot necessarily trust each other any more, but they must become mutually suspicious even when the nodes have completed an authentication exchange with the network. This creates a number of operational difficulties and new security threats. In this paper we provide a taxonomy for the IPv6 Neighbor and Router Discovery threats, describe two new cryptographic methods, Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) and Address Based Keys (ABK), and discuss how these new methods can be used to secure the Neighbor and Router discovery mechanisms.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Workshop on Wireless Security
Number of pages10
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2002
MoE publication typeA4 Conference publication
EventACM Workshop on Wireless Security - Atlanta, United States
Duration: 28 Sept 200228 Sept 2002


WorkshopACM Workshop on Wireless Security
Country/TerritoryUnited States


  • Autoconfiguration
  • Duplicate Address Detection
  • Identity-Based Cryptosystems
  • Neighbor Discovery
  • Router Discovery


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