Protecting the stack with PACed canaries

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionScientificpeer-review

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Protecting the stack with PACed canaries. / Liljestrand, Hans; Gauhar, Zaheer; Nyman, Thomas; Ekberg, Jan-Erik; Asokan, N.

SysTEX ’19, October 27, 2019, Huntsville, ON, Canada. ACM, 2019.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionScientificpeer-review

Harvard

Liljestrand, H, Gauhar, Z, Nyman, T, Ekberg, J-E & Asokan, N 2019, Protecting the stack with PACed canaries. in SysTEX ’19, October 27, 2019, Huntsville, ON, Canada. ACM, Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution, Huntsville, Canada, 27/10/2019. https://doi.org/10.1145/3342559.3365336

APA

Vancouver

Liljestrand H, Gauhar Z, Nyman T, Ekberg J-E, Asokan N. Protecting the stack with PACed canaries. In SysTEX ’19, October 27, 2019, Huntsville, ON, Canada. ACM. 2019 https://doi.org/10.1145/3342559.3365336

Author

Liljestrand, Hans ; Gauhar, Zaheer ; Nyman, Thomas ; Ekberg, Jan-Erik ; Asokan, N. / Protecting the stack with PACed canaries. SysTEX ’19, October 27, 2019, Huntsville, ON, Canada. ACM, 2019.

Bibtex - Download

@inproceedings{7a5c4744f29e48879497a683dd5b4943,
title = "Protecting the stack with PACed canaries",
abstract = "Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure andbrute-forcing attacks. We propose PCan, a new approach based on ARMv8.3-A pointer authentication (PA), that uses dynamically-generated canaries to mitigate these weaknesses and show that it provides more fine-grained protec-tion with minimal performance overhead.",
author = "Hans Liljestrand and Zaheer Gauhar and Thomas Nyman and Jan-Erik Ekberg and N. Asokan",
year = "2019",
month = "10",
day = "27",
doi = "10.1145/3342559.3365336",
language = "English",
booktitle = "SysTEX ’19, October 27, 2019, Huntsville, ON, Canada",
publisher = "ACM",

}

RIS - Download

TY - GEN

T1 - Protecting the stack with PACed canaries

AU - Liljestrand, Hans

AU - Gauhar, Zaheer

AU - Nyman, Thomas

AU - Ekberg, Jan-Erik

AU - Asokan, N.

PY - 2019/10/27

Y1 - 2019/10/27

N2 - Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure andbrute-forcing attacks. We propose PCan, a new approach based on ARMv8.3-A pointer authentication (PA), that uses dynamically-generated canaries to mitigate these weaknesses and show that it provides more fine-grained protec-tion with minimal performance overhead.

AB - Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure andbrute-forcing attacks. We propose PCan, a new approach based on ARMv8.3-A pointer authentication (PA), that uses dynamically-generated canaries to mitigate these weaknesses and show that it provides more fine-grained protec-tion with minimal performance overhead.

UR - http://10.1145/3342559.3365336

U2 - 10.1145/3342559.3365336

DO - 10.1145/3342559.3365336

M3 - Conference contribution

BT - SysTEX ’19, October 27, 2019, Huntsville, ON, Canada

PB - ACM

ER -

ID: 38543922