Protecting the stack with PACed canaries

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionScientificpeer-review


Research units

  • Huawei Technologies
  • University of Waterloo


Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and
brute-forcing attacks. We propose PCan, a new approach based on ARMv8.3-A pointer authentication (PA), that uses dynamically-generated canaries to mitigate these weaknesses and show that it provides more fine-grained protec-
tion with minimal performance overhead.


Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSysTEX ’19, October 27, 2019, Huntsville, ON, Canada
Publication statusPublished - 27 Oct 2019
MoE publication typeA4 Article in a conference publication
EventWorkshop on System Software for Trusted Execution - Colocated with SOSP'19 October 27-30 2019, Huntsville, Ontario, Canada, Huntsville, Canada
Duration: 27 Oct 201927 Oct 2019


WorkshopWorkshop on System Software for Trusted Execution
Abbreviated titleSysTEX 2019
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