Abstract
Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and
brute-forcing attacks. We propose PCan, a new approach based on ARMv8.3-A pointer authentication (PA), that uses dynamically-generated canaries to mitigate these weaknesses and show that it provides more fine-grained protec-
tion with minimal performance overhead.
brute-forcing attacks. We propose PCan, a new approach based on ARMv8.3-A pointer authentication (PA), that uses dynamically-generated canaries to mitigate these weaknesses and show that it provides more fine-grained protec-
tion with minimal performance overhead.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | SysTEX ’19, October 27, 2019, Huntsville, ON, Canada |
| Publisher | ACM |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 978-1-4503-6888-9 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 27 Oct 2019 |
| MoE publication type | A4 Article in a conference publication |
| Event | Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution - Colocated with SOSP'19 October 27-30 2019, Huntsville, Ontario, Canada, Huntsville, Canada Duration: 27 Oct 2019 → 27 Oct 2019 https://systex.ibr.cs.tu-bs.de/systex19/ |
Workshop
| Workshop | Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution |
|---|---|
| Abbreviated title | SysTEX 2019 |
| Country/Territory | Canada |
| City | Huntsville |
| Period | 27/10/2019 → 27/10/2019 |
| Internet address |