Protecting Individuals by Hiding Flow Information on Last-mile Links

Juha Järvinen; Aleksi Marttinen; Marko Luoma; Markus Peuhkuri; Jukka Manner

doi:10.1109/ICCCE.2018.8539299

Protecting Individuals by Hiding Flow Information on Last-mile Links

Juha Järvinen, Aleksi Marttinen, Marko Luoma, Markus Peuhkuri, Jukka Manner

Internet technologies

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference article in proceedings › Scientific › peer-review

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Abstract

Last-mile links connect a core network to the end-user’s communication infrastructure. A single user’s traffic can flow alone at a link, and thus an adversary can eavesdrop on the communication at the link, deducing critical information. Even if the traffic is encrypted, an aggressive enemy may perform statistical analysis based on the detected traffic. The results of this analysis may yield information in the communication that is private, characteristics of the communications, such as destination node or utilized networking protocols. With this information individual’s privacy can be damaged. In this paper we introduce a system that enhances remarkably user privacy on last mile links by making it more difficult for an adversary to perform statistical analysis. The system is based on one of the onion routing realizations Tor that is improved with the Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) technique. Either a network operator or a service operator can deliver this service to customers. Moreover, we have measured the performance of our system that conceals flow information on last-mile link and beyond enhancing individual’s privacy.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2018 7th International Conference on Computer and Communication Engineering (ICCCE)
Publisher	IEEE
Pages	141-146
ISBN (Electronic)	978-1-5386-6992-1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCCE.2018.8539299
Publication status	Published - 19 Sept 2018
MoE publication type	A4 Conference publication
Event	International Conference on Computer and Communication Engineering: Innovative Technologies to Serve Humanity - Kulliyyah of Engineering, International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Duration: 19 Sept 2018 → 20 Sept 2018 Conference number: 7 http://www.iium.edu.my/iccce/18/

Conference

Conference	International Conference on Computer and Communication Engineering
Abbreviated title	ICCCE
Country/Territory	Malaysia
City	Kuala Lumpur
Period	19/09/2018 → 20/09/2018
Internet address	http://www.iium.edu.my/iccce/18/

Keywords

network security
privacy
last-mile networking

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10.1109/ICCCE.2018.8539299

ELEC-jarvinen-et-al-protecting-individuals-ICCCEAccepted author manuscript, 667 KB

Cite this

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title = "Protecting Individuals by Hiding Flow Information on Last-mile Links",

abstract = "Last-mile links connect a core network to the end-user{\textquoteright}s communication infrastructure. A single user{\textquoteright}s traffic can flow alone at a link, and thus an adversary can eavesdrop on the communication at the link, deducing critical information. Even if the traffic is encrypted, an aggressive enemy may perform statistical analysis based on the detected traffic. The results of this analysis may yield information in the communication that is private, characteristics of the communications, such as destination node or utilized networking protocols. With this information individual{\textquoteright}s privacy can be damaged. In this paper we introduce a system that enhances remarkably user privacy on last mile links by making it more difficult for an adversary to perform statistical analysis. The system is based on one of the onion routing realizations Tor that is improved with the Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) technique. Either a network operator or a service operator can deliver this service to customers. Moreover, we have measured the performance of our system that conceals flow information on last-mile link and beyond enhancing individual{\textquoteright}s privacy.",

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author = "Juha J{\"a}rvinen and Aleksi Marttinen and Marko Luoma and Markus Peuhkuri and Jukka Manner",

year = "2018",

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booktitle = "2018 7th International Conference on Computer and Communication Engineering (ICCCE)",

publisher = "IEEE",

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note = "International Conference on Computer and Communication Engineering : Innovative Technologies to Serve Humanity, ICCCE ; Conference date: 19-09-2018 Through 20-09-2018",

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}

Järvinen, J , Marttinen, A , Luoma, M , Peuhkuri, M & Manner, J 2018, Protecting Individuals by Hiding Flow Information on Last-mile Links. in 2018 7th International Conference on Computer and Communication Engineering (ICCCE). IEEE, pp. 141-146, International Conference on Computer and Communication Engineering, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 19/09/2018. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCCE.2018.8539299

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T1 - Protecting Individuals by Hiding Flow Information on Last-mile Links

AU - Järvinen, Juha

AU - Marttinen, Aleksi

AU - Luoma, Marko

AU - Peuhkuri, Markus

AU - Manner, Jukka

N1 - Conference code: 7

PY - 2018/9/19

Y1 - 2018/9/19

N2 - Last-mile links connect a core network to the end-user’s communication infrastructure. A single user’s traffic can flow alone at a link, and thus an adversary can eavesdrop on the communication at the link, deducing critical information. Even if the traffic is encrypted, an aggressive enemy may perform statistical analysis based on the detected traffic. The results of this analysis may yield information in the communication that is private, characteristics of the communications, such as destination node or utilized networking protocols. With this information individual’s privacy can be damaged. In this paper we introduce a system that enhances remarkably user privacy on last mile links by making it more difficult for an adversary to perform statistical analysis. The system is based on one of the onion routing realizations Tor that is improved with the Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) technique. Either a network operator or a service operator can deliver this service to customers. Moreover, we have measured the performance of our system that conceals flow information on last-mile link and beyond enhancing individual’s privacy.

AB - Last-mile links connect a core network to the end-user’s communication infrastructure. A single user’s traffic can flow alone at a link, and thus an adversary can eavesdrop on the communication at the link, deducing critical information. Even if the traffic is encrypted, an aggressive enemy may perform statistical analysis based on the detected traffic. The results of this analysis may yield information in the communication that is private, characteristics of the communications, such as destination node or utilized networking protocols. With this information individual’s privacy can be damaged. In this paper we introduce a system that enhances remarkably user privacy on last mile links by making it more difficult for an adversary to perform statistical analysis. The system is based on one of the onion routing realizations Tor that is improved with the Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) technique. Either a network operator or a service operator can deliver this service to customers. Moreover, we have measured the performance of our system that conceals flow information on last-mile link and beyond enhancing individual’s privacy.

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KW - privacy

KW - last-mile networking

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DO - 10.1109/ICCCE.2018.8539299

M3 - Conference article in proceedings

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BT - 2018 7th International Conference on Computer and Communication Engineering (ICCCE)

PB - IEEE

T2 - International Conference on Computer and Communication Engineering

Y2 - 19 September 2018 through 20 September 2018

ER -

Protecting Individuals by Hiding Flow Information on Last-mile Links

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Keywords

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