TY - JOUR
T1 - Partisan political beliefs and social learning
AU - Robbett, Andrea
AU - Colón, Lily
AU - Matthews, Peter
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2023/4
Y1 - 2023/4
N2 - American politics is currently characterized by polarized beliefs about otherwise verifiable realities, a pathology often ascribed to the influence of “echo chambers” on like-minded partisans. Partisans may seek out the views of like-minded individuals for either instrumental reasons, that is, because co-partisans are presumed to know more, or for expressive reasons, to learn or confirm “partisan congenial” beliefs. We conduct an online experiment to characterize the demand for, and use of, social information about political beliefs. We find that participants are responsive to the cues of both co-partisans and mixed partisan groups, but are less disposed to consult opposing partisans or to follow their beliefs. However, when a reliable source of outside information becomes available, participants are much less likely to seek social information of any kind, consistent with an instrumental rather than expressive motive. In short, there is mistrust across partisan lines but also a willingness to consult social information in pursuit of “correct beliefs.” The further observation that those who do consult peers are not correct more often underscores the importance of reliable private information as a bulwark against some of the pernicious effects of echo chambers.
AB - American politics is currently characterized by polarized beliefs about otherwise verifiable realities, a pathology often ascribed to the influence of “echo chambers” on like-minded partisans. Partisans may seek out the views of like-minded individuals for either instrumental reasons, that is, because co-partisans are presumed to know more, or for expressive reasons, to learn or confirm “partisan congenial” beliefs. We conduct an online experiment to characterize the demand for, and use of, social information about political beliefs. We find that participants are responsive to the cues of both co-partisans and mixed partisan groups, but are less disposed to consult opposing partisans or to follow their beliefs. However, when a reliable source of outside information becomes available, participants are much less likely to seek social information of any kind, consistent with an instrumental rather than expressive motive. In short, there is mistrust across partisan lines but also a willingness to consult social information in pursuit of “correct beliefs.” The further observation that those who do consult peers are not correct more often underscores the importance of reliable private information as a bulwark against some of the pernicious effects of echo chambers.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85148606742&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104834
DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104834
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85148606742
SN - 0047-2727
VL - 220
JO - JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
JF - JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
M1 - 104834
ER -