Abstract
The adoption of security protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) has significantly improved the state of traffic encryption and integrity protection on the Internet. Despite rigorous analysis, vulnerabilities continue to emerge, sometimes due to fundamental flaws in the protocol specification. This paper examines the security of TLS when using Raw Public Key (RPK) authentication. This mode has not been as extensively studied as X.509 certificates and Pre-Shared Keys (PSK). We develop a formal model of TLS RPK using applied pi calculus and the ProVerif verification tool, revealing that the RPK mode is susceptible to identity misbinding attacks. Our contributions include formal models of TLS RPK with several mechanisms for binding the endpoint identity to its public key, verification results, practical scenarios demonstrating the misbinding attack, and recommendations for mitigating such vulnerabilities. These findings highlight the need for improved security measures in TLS RPK.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Secure IT Systems - 29th Nordic Conference, NordSec 2024, Proceedings |
Editors | Leonardo Horn Iwaya, Liina Kamm, Leonardo Martucci, Tobias Pulls |
Publisher | Springer |
Pages | 62-79 |
Number of pages | 18 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 978-3-031-79007-2 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-3-031-79006-5 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 28 Jan 2025 |
MoE publication type | A4 Conference publication |
Event | Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems - Karlstad, Sweden Duration: 6 Nov 2024 → 7 Nov 2024 Conference number: 29 |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Publisher | Springer |
Volume | 15396 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
Conference | Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems |
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Abbreviated title | NordSec |
Country/Territory | Sweden |
City | Karlstad |
Period | 06/11/2024 → 07/11/2024 |
Keywords
- formal modeling
- identity misbinding
- raw public key
- TLS