LO-FAT: Low-Overhead Control Flow ATtestation in Hardware

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionScientificpeer-review


  • Ghada Dessouky
  • Shaza Zeitouni
  • Thomas Nyman
  • Andrew Paverd
  • Lucas Davi
  • Patrick Koeberl
  • N. Asokan
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

Research units

  • Technische Universität Darmstadt
  • University of Duisburg-Essen
  • Trustonic
  • Intel Labs


Attacks targeting software on embedded systems are becoming increasingly prevalent. Remote attestation is a mechanism that allows establishing trust in embedded devices. However, existing attestation schemes are either static and cannot detect control-flow attacks, or require instrumentation of software incurring high performance overheads. To overcome these limitations, we present LO-FAT, the first practical hardware-based approach to control-flow attestation. By leveraging existing processor hardware features and commonly-used IP blocks, our approach enables efficient control-flow attestation without requiring software instrumentation. We show that our proof-of-concept implementation based on a RISC-V SoC incurs no processor stalls and requires reasonable area overhead.


Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 54th Annual Design Automation Conference 2017, DAC 2017
Publication statusPublished - 18 Jun 2017
MoE publication typeA4 Article in a conference publication
EventAnnual Design Automation Conference - Austin, United States
Duration: 18 Jun 201722 Jun 2017
Conference number: 54


ConferenceAnnual Design Automation Conference
Abbreviated titleDAC
CountryUnited States

ID: 14550611