Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders

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Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders. / Murto, Pauli; Välimäki, Juuso.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 169, 01.05.2017, p. 629-640.

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@article{0393f7d393d54380bd8bb30ca041e0de,
title = "Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders",
abstract = "This note analyzes different types of all-pay auctions when the number of bidders becomes large. We compute the distributions of the highest bids for the first-price all pay auction and we show that the expected payment made by the winning bidder converges to half of the total payments. In the second-price all-pay auction (the war of attrition), the highest bid amounts to about 35.5{\%} of the total revenues. We also compute the payments for all-pay auctions with multiple prizes.",
keywords = "All-pay auction, Large auctions",
author = "Pauli Murto and Juuso V{\"a}lim{\"a}ki",
year = "2017",
month = "5",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.008",
language = "English",
volume = "169",
pages = "629--640",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders

AU - Murto, Pauli

AU - Välimäki, Juuso

PY - 2017/5/1

Y1 - 2017/5/1

N2 - This note analyzes different types of all-pay auctions when the number of bidders becomes large. We compute the distributions of the highest bids for the first-price all pay auction and we show that the expected payment made by the winning bidder converges to half of the total payments. In the second-price all-pay auction (the war of attrition), the highest bid amounts to about 35.5% of the total revenues. We also compute the payments for all-pay auctions with multiple prizes.

AB - This note analyzes different types of all-pay auctions when the number of bidders becomes large. We compute the distributions of the highest bids for the first-price all pay auction and we show that the expected payment made by the winning bidder converges to half of the total payments. In the second-price all-pay auction (the war of attrition), the highest bid amounts to about 35.5% of the total revenues. We also compute the payments for all-pay auctions with multiple prizes.

KW - All-pay auction

KW - Large auctions

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85016391551&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.008

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.008

M3 - Article

VL - 169

SP - 629

EP - 640

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

ER -

ID: 11622790