Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders
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Abstract
This note analyzes different types of all-pay auctions when the number of bidders becomes large. We compute the distributions of the highest bids for the first-price all pay auction and we show that the expected payment made by the winning bidder converges to half of the total payments. In the second-price all-pay auction (the war of attrition), the highest bid amounts to about 35.5% of the total revenues. We also compute the payments for all-pay auctions with multiple prizes.
Details
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 629-640 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 169 |
| Publication status | Published - 1 May 2017 |
| MoE publication type | A1 Journal article-refereed |
- All-pay auction, Large auctions
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ID: 11622790
