Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders

Pauli Murto*, Juuso Välimäki

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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Abstract

This note analyzes different types of all-pay auctions when the number of bidders becomes large. We compute the distributions of the highest bids for the first-price all pay auction and we show that the expected payment made by the winning bidder converges to half of the total payments. In the second-price all-pay auction (the war of attrition), the highest bid amounts to about 35.5% of the total revenues. We also compute the payments for all-pay auctions with multiple prizes.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)629-640
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume169
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2017
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Keywords

  • All-pay auction
  • Large auctions

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