Implementing prover-side proximity verification for strengthening transparent authentication

Mika Juuti, Christian Vaas, Hans Liljestrand, Ivo Sluganovic, N Asokan, Ivan Martinovic

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Transparent authentication schemes based on proximity verification over a wireless channel are susceptible to relay attacks. In recent literature several countermeasures have been proposed. However these come with drawbacks in terms of usability and deployability. In this demo, we show a prototype implementation of STASH, a scheme for securing transparent authentication schemes using prover-side proximity verification, presented at SECON 2017.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2017 14th Annual IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication and Networking (SECON), 12-14 June 2017, San Diego, CA, USA
Subtitle of host publicationDemo Session
PublisherIEEE
Pages1-2
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-5090-1732-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017
MoE publication typeA4 Article in a conference publication
EventIEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication and Networking - San Diego, United States
Duration: 12 Jun 201714 Jun 2017
Conference number: 14

Conference

ConferenceIEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication and Networking
Abbreviated titleSECON
CountryUnited States
CitySan Diego
Period12/06/201714/06/2017

Keywords

  • Trajectory
  • Authentication
  • Relays
  • Hidden Markov models
  • Protocols
  • Data processing

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