From ideals to deals - The effect of impartiality experience on stakeholder behavior

Marja Liisa Halko, Topi Miettinen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)
158 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeholders’ private endowments. Both the two stakeholders and third-party arbitrators may influence the outcome. We consider Nash-demand negotiations, where the two stakeholders place demands and share the pie accordingly if demands are compatible, and elicit dictatorial allocations from the stakeholders and the arbitrators. The Nash demands by stakeholders are strategic; the dictatorial allocations by stakeholders and arbitrators are non-strategic. We are interested in the influence of the past arbitrator experience on stakeholder allocations and demands and the past stakeholder experience on third-party arbitration allocations. We find that the ex-arbitrators’ stakeholder allocations differ more from the impartial ideal than the stakeholder allocations by those without arbitration experience. In contrast with previous findings, the arbitration outcomes do not depend on the asymmetries in the previous stakeholder roles.

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages16
JournalPloS one
Volume12
Issue number8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2017
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'From ideals to deals - The effect of impartiality experience on stakeholder behavior'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this