Ex-post Analysis of the TeliaSonera-Chess 2005 Merger

Norbert Maier; Julie Runge Jørgensen; Asger Lunde; Otto Toivanen

doi:10.1007/s10645-020-09381-y

Ex-post Analysis of the TeliaSonera-Chess 2005 Merger

Norbert Maier
, Julie Runge Jørgensen
, Asger Lunde^*
, Otto Toivanen

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We provide an ex-post analysis of the 2005 TeliaSonera-Chess merger in the Norwegian mobile telecommunication market. Applying a difference-in-difference approach and a synthetic control group method we find little evidence of price increase in the Norwegian mobile telecom market after the merger. Possible explanations for these findings include that Chess was a small player in the market without its own physical network, with a market share of 8% at the time of the merger and no spectrum license, and that by taking Chess on board moving it from Telenor’s network, TeliaSonera could better exploit potential economies of scale related to the operation of its physical network and spectrum.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	141-178
Number of pages	38
Journal	De Economist
Volume	169
Early online date	1 Jan 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-020-09381-y
Publication status	Published - May 2021
MoE publication type	A1 Journal article-refereed

Funding

The authors would like to thank Henrik Ballebye Okholm, Bruno Basalisco and Claus Kastberg Nielsen for helpful comments, Elisa Pau and Mattias Almqvist for excellent research assistance, and the Norwegian Competition Authority for funding. All the remaining errors are those of the authors.

Keywords

Ex-post studies
Merger control
MNO
MVNO
Telecommunications

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10.1007/s10645-020-09381-y

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abstract = "We provide an ex-post analysis of the 2005 TeliaSonera-Chess merger in the Norwegian mobile telecommunication market. Applying a difference-in-difference approach and a synthetic control group method we find little evidence of price increase in the Norwegian mobile telecom market after the merger. Possible explanations for these findings include that Chess was a small player in the market without its own physical network, with a market share of 8\% at the time of the merger and no spectrum license, and that by taking Chess on board moving it from Telenor{\textquoteright}s network, TeliaSonera could better exploit potential economies of scale related to the operation of its physical network and spectrum.",

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AU - Toivanen, Otto

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AB - We provide an ex-post analysis of the 2005 TeliaSonera-Chess merger in the Norwegian mobile telecommunication market. Applying a difference-in-difference approach and a synthetic control group method we find little evidence of price increase in the Norwegian mobile telecom market after the merger. Possible explanations for these findings include that Chess was a small player in the market without its own physical network, with a market share of 8% at the time of the merger and no spectrum license, and that by taking Chess on board moving it from Telenor’s network, TeliaSonera could better exploit potential economies of scale related to the operation of its physical network and spectrum.

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Ex-post Analysis of the TeliaSonera-Chess 2005 Merger

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