Abstract
This paper examines the subgame-perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games with finite state and action spaces. The fixed-point characterization of equilibria is generalized to unobservable mixed strategies. It is also shown that the pure-strategy equilibria consist of elementary subpaths, which are repeating fragments that give the acceptable action plans in the game. The developed methodology offers a novel way of computing and analyzing equilibrium strategies that need not be stationary nor Markovian.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 304-323 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Dynamic Games and Applications |
Volume | 6 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Sept 2016 |
MoE publication type | A1 Journal article-refereed |
Keywords
- Equilibrium path
- Fixed-point equation
- Game theory
- Stochastic game
- Subgame-perfect equilibrium
- Tree