Elementary Subpaths in Discounted Stochastic Games

Kimmo Berg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines the subgame-perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games with finite state and action spaces. The fixed-point characterization of equilibria is generalized to unobservable mixed strategies. It is also shown that the pure-strategy equilibria consist of elementary subpaths, which are repeating fragments that give the acceptable action plans in the game. The developed methodology offers a novel way of computing and analyzing equilibrium strategies that need not be stationary nor Markovian.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)304-323
Number of pages20
JournalDynamic Games and Applications
Volume6
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2016
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Keywords

  • Equilibrium path
  • Fixed-point equation
  • Game theory
  • Stochastic game
  • Subgame-perfect equilibrium
  • Tree

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