Does empowerment maximisation allow for enactive artificial agents?

Christian Guckelsberger*, Christoph Salge

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference article in proceedingsScientificpeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The enactive AI framework wants to overcome the sense-making limitations of embodied AI by drawing on the bio-systemic foundations of enactive cognitive science. While embodied AI tries to ground meaning in sensorimotor interaction, enactive AI adds further requirements by grounding sensorimotor interaction in autonomous agency. At the core of this shift is the requirement for a truly intrinsic value function. We suggest that empowerment, an information-theoretic quantity based on an agent’s embodiment, represents such a function. We highlight the role of empowerment maximisation in satisfying the requirements of enactive AI, i.e. establishing constitutive autonomy and adaptivity, in detail. We then argue that empowerment, grounded in a precarious existence, allows an agent to enact a world based on the relevance of environmental features in respect to its own identity.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Artificial Life Conference 2016, ALIFE 2016
PublisherMIT Press
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9780262339360
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016
MoE publication typeA4 Conference publication
EventConference on Artificial Life - Cancun, Mexico
Duration: 4 Jul 20168 Jul 2016
Conference number: 15

Conference

ConferenceConference on Artificial Life
Abbreviated titleALIFE
Country/TerritoryMexico
CityCancun
Period04/07/201608/07/2016

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