Deterring fraud by looking away

Deniz Okat*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Individuals being audited potentially learn how to exploit the weaknesses inherent in any audit methodology if they face the same method many times. Hence, an auditor better deters fraud by randomizing her choice of methodology over time, thereby frustrating a would-be fraudster's ability to learn. In the extreme, an auditor benefits from refusing to audit, even though audits are costless to her.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)734-747
Number of pages14
JournalRAND Journal of Economics
Volume47
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2016
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Deterring fraud by looking away'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this