Deterring fraud by looking away

Deniz Okat

doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12140

Deterring fraud by looking away

Deniz Okat^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Finance

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Individuals being audited potentially learn how to exploit the weaknesses inherent in any audit methodology if they face the same method many times. Hence, an auditor better deters fraud by randomizing her choice of methodology over time, thereby frustrating a would-be fraudster's ability to learn. In the extreme, an auditor benefits from refusing to audit, even though audits are costless to her.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	734-747
Number of pages	14
Journal	RAND Journal of Economics
Volume	47
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12140
Publication status	Published - 1 Sep 2016
MoE publication type	A1 Journal article-refereed

Access to Document

10.1111/1756-2171.12140

Link to publication in Scopus

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