Determinants of voluntary executive stock option disclosure in Brazil

Eduardo Schiehll*, Paulo Renato Soares Terra, Fernanda Gomes Victor

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study investigates whether the governance attributes of Brazilian companies are associated with voluntary executive stock option (ESO) disclosure. Results show that Brazilian companies voluntarily disclose very little about their ESO plans, and that board size, presence of a compensation committee, and auditing by a Big 4 firm are significantly related to the degree of voluntary ESO disclosure. We also show that family-controlled companies in Brazil are associated with low voluntary ESO disclosure. Results are robust to a number of specification tests, dependent and explanatory variable measurements, and sample composition. This study has professional and regulatory implications for Brazil and other emerging capital markets. The results underscore the need for stricter rules for executive compensation reporting in Brazil, and they invite policy makers and regulators in emerging markets to consider the effects of company-level governance factors on disclosure incentives.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)331-361
Number of pages31
JournalJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE
Volume17
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2013
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Keywords

  • Brazil
  • Emerging markets
  • Executive compensation
  • Stock options
  • Voluntary disclosure

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