Consistent conjectures and the evolutionary stability of other-regarding preferences

Ilkka Leppänen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

In a model of evolution in a large but finite population, players in two-player games adopt other-regarding preferences over their opponents' material payoffs. We show that when the players have consistent conjectures the evolutionarily stable other-regarding preference approaches the self-regarding limit, i.e. zero, as the population size increases. When players have zero conjectures, the evolutionarily stable other-regarding preference depends on the complementarity parameter that defines the contextual specification of the game.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)53-55
Number of pages3
JournalECONOMICS LETTERS
Volume142
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2016
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Keywords

  • Conjectures
  • Evolutionary games
  • Other-regarding preferences

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Consistent conjectures and the evolutionary stability of other-regarding preferences'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this