Blockholder Structures and Power Mechanisms in Family Firms

Gabriella Cacciotti*, Deniz Ucbasaran

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We extend the work of Fattoum-Guedri, Guedri, and Delmar (2018) by suggesting that the number of family blockholders moderates the relationship between the distribution of voting power between family and nonfamily blockholders and firm performance. Building on power and negotiation theories, we argue that the participation of multiple generations of family members in the firm's ownership leads to greater diversity of perspectives that generates potential conflict over the distribution of resources. We highlight four power mechanisms-potential power, perceived power, power games, and realized power-to explain why family blockholders' conflicting and/or misaligned preferences, objectives, and visions for the family firm might influence the nature of the negotiation between the family and the nonfamily blockholder and impact family firm performance. We offer directions for future research.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)252-258
Number of pages7
JournalEntrepreneurship Theory and Practice
Volume42
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2018
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Keywords

  • family business
  • power mechanisms
  • CONSEQUENCES
  • NEGOTIATION
  • SENSEMAKING
  • GOVERNANCE
  • OWNERSHIP
  • AGENCY

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