Abstract
Allowing a compromised device to e.g., receive privacy-sensitive sensor readings carries significant privacy risks, but to implement the relying party of a contemporary attestation protocol in a computationally constrained sensor is not feasible, and the network reach of a sensor is often limited. In this paper, we present a remote platform attestation protocol suitable for relying parties that are limited to symmetric-key cryptography and a single communication channel. We validate its security with the ProVerif model checker.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy |
Editors | Gabriele Lenzini, Paolo Mori, Steven Furnell |
Publisher | SciTePress |
Pages | 701-708 |
Number of pages | 8 |
ISBN (Print) | 9789897586835 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2024 |
MoE publication type | A4 Conference publication |
Event | International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Rome, Italy Duration: 26 Feb 2024 → 28 Feb 2024 Conference number: 10 |
Publication series
Name | International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy |
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Volume | 1 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 2184-4356 |
Conference
Conference | International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy |
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Abbreviated title | ICISSP |
Country/Territory | Italy |
City | Rome |
Period | 26/02/2024 → 28/02/2024 |
Keywords
- Device Security
- Model Checking
- Remote Attestation