We study why managers engage in corporate political strategizing. Our rigorous data driven historical study of top management strategizing, of a state-owned telecommunications provider for a period of 18 years, exposes previously unattended links between top management’s managerial discretion and engagement in political strategizing. We find two managerial discretion dilemmas triggering political strategizing during market convergence: (1) resource discretion due to asymmetric regulation; and (2) market discretion due to unbalanced competitive preconditions. We contribute with a novel understanding of the contextual and managerial antecedents of political strategizing, and a dynamic view on managerial discretion. Furthermore, we advance a rigorous digital history approach, one that is historically cognizant and temporally and contextually grounded, to study top management strategizing.
|Publication status||Published - 1 Jan 2018|
|MoE publication type||Not Eligible|
|Event||Academy of Management Annual Meeting: Improving Lives - Chicago, United States|
Duration: 10 Aug 2018 → 14 Aug 2018
Conference number: 78
|Conference||Academy of Management Annual Meeting|
|Period||10/08/2018 → 14/08/2018|