Artificial intelligence and free will: generative agents utilizing large language models have functional free will

Combining large language models (LLMs) with memory, planning, and execution units has made possible almost human-like agentic behavior, where the artificial intelligence creates goals for itself, breaks them into concrete plans, and refines the tactics based on sensory feedback. Do such generative LLM agents possess free will? Free will requires that an entity exhibits intentional agency, has genuine alternatives, and can control its actions. Building on Dennett’s intentional stance and List’s theory of free will, I will focus on functional free will, where we observe an entity to determine whether we need to postulate free will to understand and predict its behavior. Focusing on two running examples, the recently developed Voyager, an LLM-powered Minecraft agent, and the fictitious Spitenik, an assassin drone, I will argue that the best (and only viable) way of explaining both of their behavior involves postulating that they have goals, face alternatives, and that their intentions guide their behavior. While this does not entail that they have consciousness or that they possess physical free will, where their intentions alter physical causal chains, we must nevertheless conclude that they are agents whose behavior cannot be understood without postulating that they possess functional free will.