An anatomy of cartel contracts

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An anatomy of cartel contracts. / Hyytinen, Ari; Steen, Frode; Toivanen, Otto.

In: ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Vol. 129, No. 621, 07.2019, p. 2155-2191.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Harvard

Hyytinen, A, Steen, F & Toivanen, O 2019, 'An anatomy of cartel contracts' ECONOMIC JOURNAL, vol. 129, no. 621, pp. 2155-2191. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12633

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Hyytinen, Ari ; Steen, Frode ; Toivanen, Otto. / An anatomy of cartel contracts. In: ECONOMIC JOURNAL. 2019 ; Vol. 129, No. 621. pp. 2155-2191.

Bibtex - Download

@article{82700c78a8a84484825b697fc9e02247,
title = "An anatomy of cartel contracts",
abstract = "We study the contracts of 898 legal Finnish cartels. Cartels that exclusively allocate markets, either geographically or in the product/production space, are dominant in manufacturing. They are often bilateral and include a vertical dimension. Structural industry characteristics predict the type of a cartel; e.g., consistent with theory, quota cartels are more common in manufacturing and when buyers are primarily industrial. The contracts of quota cartels include more (governance) clauses. Pure pricing cartels are the dominant cartel type in non-manufacturing and are more common when demand is primarily from retail buyers. Pricing cartels are larger than other types of cartels.",
keywords = "cartels, contracts, antitrust, competition policy, industry heterogeneity",
author = "Ari Hyytinen and Frode Steen and Otto Toivanen",
year = "2019",
month = "7",
doi = "10.1111/ecoj.12633",
language = "English",
volume = "129",
pages = "2155--2191",
journal = "ECONOMIC JOURNAL",
issn = "0013-0133",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "621",

}

RIS - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - An anatomy of cartel contracts

AU - Hyytinen, Ari

AU - Steen, Frode

AU - Toivanen, Otto

PY - 2019/7

Y1 - 2019/7

N2 - We study the contracts of 898 legal Finnish cartels. Cartels that exclusively allocate markets, either geographically or in the product/production space, are dominant in manufacturing. They are often bilateral and include a vertical dimension. Structural industry characteristics predict the type of a cartel; e.g., consistent with theory, quota cartels are more common in manufacturing and when buyers are primarily industrial. The contracts of quota cartels include more (governance) clauses. Pure pricing cartels are the dominant cartel type in non-manufacturing and are more common when demand is primarily from retail buyers. Pricing cartels are larger than other types of cartels.

AB - We study the contracts of 898 legal Finnish cartels. Cartels that exclusively allocate markets, either geographically or in the product/production space, are dominant in manufacturing. They are often bilateral and include a vertical dimension. Structural industry characteristics predict the type of a cartel; e.g., consistent with theory, quota cartels are more common in manufacturing and when buyers are primarily industrial. The contracts of quota cartels include more (governance) clauses. Pure pricing cartels are the dominant cartel type in non-manufacturing and are more common when demand is primarily from retail buyers. Pricing cartels are larger than other types of cartels.

KW - cartels

KW - contracts

KW - antitrust

KW - competition policy

KW - industry heterogeneity

U2 - 10.1111/ecoj.12633

DO - 10.1111/ecoj.12633

M3 - Article

VL - 129

SP - 2155

EP - 2191

JO - ECONOMIC JOURNAL

JF - ECONOMIC JOURNAL

SN - 0013-0133

IS - 621

ER -

ID: 27373423