Abstract
We develop a multilevel perspective on how acts of corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) emerge and develop over time. We specifically focus on what we label as “organized and intentional CSI”—the irresponsible activities undertaken by several colluding
actors that cause harm to multiple stakeholders. Our choice was informed by the prevalence of organized and intentional CSI in countries with strong regulatory safeguards and monitoring mechanisms. By merging the literature on CSI and institutional
entrepreneurship, we conceptualize the dynamic unfolding of organized and intentional CSI in three stages: actuating, propagating, and collectivizing. We identify six areas for
further investigation that can meaningfully inform policies: the intentional dark side of institutional entrepreneurs, the unintended actions of regulators, the role of investigative journalists, the impact of institutional conditions, various forms of interrelated multilevel decoupling, and multiple moral ethos. We also propose several policy implications. First, simplifying regulation and decreasing the number of regulatory agencies can reduce institutional uncertainties and mitigate chances for opportunistic behavior. Second, through extensive consultations with stakeholders and limiting opportunities for preferential access, policymakers can minimize the risk of regulatory capture. Finally, promoting self-regulation that incorporates norms of responsible leadership and power distribution could complement other efforts in curbing CSI.
actors that cause harm to multiple stakeholders. Our choice was informed by the prevalence of organized and intentional CSI in countries with strong regulatory safeguards and monitoring mechanisms. By merging the literature on CSI and institutional
entrepreneurship, we conceptualize the dynamic unfolding of organized and intentional CSI in three stages: actuating, propagating, and collectivizing. We identify six areas for
further investigation that can meaningfully inform policies: the intentional dark side of institutional entrepreneurs, the unintended actions of regulators, the role of investigative journalists, the impact of institutional conditions, various forms of interrelated multilevel decoupling, and multiple moral ethos. We also propose several policy implications. First, simplifying regulation and decreasing the number of regulatory agencies can reduce institutional uncertainties and mitigate chances for opportunistic behavior. Second, through extensive consultations with stakeholders and limiting opportunities for preferential access, policymakers can minimize the risk of regulatory capture. Finally, promoting self-regulation that incorporates norms of responsible leadership and power distribution could complement other efforts in curbing CSI.
Original language | English |
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Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Academy of Management Perspectives |
Early online date | 26 Sept 2024 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 26 Sept 2024 |
MoE publication type | A1 Journal article-refereed |